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Tensions over North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
programs remain high although diplomacy has 
taken a prominent role in recent weeks. With summit 
meetings scheduled between South and North 
Korea and between the United States and North 
Korea in the coming months, cooperation between 
the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK, South Korea) is more important than ever.
The leaders of three security partners have 
emphasized their unity, but their cooperation 
faces challenges both despite and because of the 
significance of the North Korean threat. On the one 
hand, the shared threat emanating from Pyongyang 
creates a centripetal force that binds Washington, 
Tokyo, and Seoul because the three partners need 
mutual assistance. On the other hand, however, 
the high stakes involved in the North Korea policy 
of these states also intensify discord over the 
means to address the threat, thereby producing a 
centrifugal force. 
The three partners must not lose sight of their 
common interest in countering the North Korean 
threat, but it is also important to understand each 
other’s bottom line. Precisely because they have 
so much common interest, it is tempting to see 
divergent policies of each other as emotional, 
misguided or irresponsible without genuinely 
appreciating the others’ gravest concerns. Granted, 
in addition to preferences for different strategies, 
there are many other important factors that affect 
their North Korea policy – ranging from personal 
differences among leaders to domestic political 
necessity to historical discord between Japan and 
South Korea. It is imperative, however, for security 
partners to understand reasonable differences in 
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each other’s strategic priorities even with respect 
to the shared adversary.
Preventing a devastating war on the Korean 
Peninsula has priority over almost any other 
conceivable foreign policy task for Seoul. Land 
contiguity and proximity of the Seoul metropolitan 
area, which houses about half of the country’s 
population, to the northern border make the country 
far more vulnerable to North Korean attacks than 
the United States or Japan. This vulnerability 
explains why South Korean President Moon Jae-in 
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Policies that hurt each other’s fundamental 
security interests have to be pursued only 
with careful consultation with the partners, 
for both the policies’ effectiveness and 
for the maintenance of the partnerships. 
For effective cooperation, the U.S., 
Japanese, and ROK governments must 
all embrace the centripetal force of the 
North Korean threat while being mindful 
of the centrifugal force.
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pledged that his government “will block war by all 
means.” North Korea’s nuclear weapons increase 
the potential destructiveness of its attack on 
the South, and Pyongyang’s long-range missiles 
can also damage the credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence, but it is too risky for Seoul to start a 
war to prevent their development.
Japan’s security interest is best served by 
eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program. 
Having faced North Korea’s hostile attitude for 
decades, Japan has good reasons to fear North 
Korea’s nuclear threats – not least because Japan 
hosts U.S. military bases with important roles in 
contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. The ocean 
surrounding the island country offers natural 
barriers against North Korea’s military force, but 
North Korean nuclear weapons can inflict massive 
damage on Japan. Nuclear disarmament of North 
Korea, therefore, is a top priority for Japan’s 
national security. Japan has been within the range 
of North Korean missiles for years and North Korea 
does not need long-range missiles to hit Japan, 
but Tokyo still has concerns about North Korea’s 
long-range missiles diminishing the U.S. extended 
deterrence for Japan.
Among the three partners, the United States is 
arguably the least vulnerable to North Korean 
attacks, but Washington still seeks to minimize 
North Korean threats to the U.S. territory. From 
the U.S. perspective, the recent progress in 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs has 
transformed the problem from management of 
East Asian security and nuclear non-proliferation to 
a direct threat to its own security. A large number 
of U.S. soldiers and their families in South Korea 
have been exposed to North Korean military threat 
for a long time, but the U.S. threat perception is 
higher now that American cities can be devastated 
by North Korean nuclear missiles. For those who 
believe that Pyongyang has not yet acquired the 
capabilities to strike the mainland United States 
with nuclear warheads, the urgency of stopping 
North Korea is particularly strong. A preventive 
war is risky, but if one thinks war is likely, it might 
appear to be better to fight now than later so that 
the damage of the war is limited to “over there.”
Considering their respective bottom lines, what 
should the three security partners do? Given 
Seoul’s strong reluctance, it is problematic to 
publicly threaten Pyongyang with a preventive war. 
Although such a threat can have its advantages in 
bargaining, it will destabilize U.S. relations not only 
with North Korea but also with South Korea. Seoul 
in turn needs to respect the U.S. and Japanese 
efforts at sanctions to curtail North Korean nuclear 
and missile programs even if these sanctions are 
in the way of inter-Korean reconciliation. Policies 
that hurt each other’s fundamental security 
interests have to be pursued only with careful 
consultation with the partners, for both the 
policies’ effectiveness and for the maintenance 
of the partnerships. The Moon government’s 
diplomatic initiatives so far have been impressive, 
but South Korean leaders should also be careful 
not to make Washington and Tokyo uncomfortable 
and alienated from the peace diplomacy.
In reality, the leaders of the United States, Japan, 
and South Korea also face pressure from domestic 
politics and other foreign policy issues. For 
instance, domestic political incentives to appear 
tough against the evil regime in Pyongyang or 
fresh and different from previous administrations 
can complicate diplomacy. The leaders need to 
minimize the negative consequences of such 
domestic political theater. Trilateral cooperation 
against North Korean threats – for example, 
in missile defense – affects other actors such 
as China. The United States and Japan should 
recognize South Korea’s need to not antagonize 
the giant neighbor, if only because Beijing’s 
cooperation is crucial in dealing with Pyongyang. 
South Korea, in turn, needs to remember the 
importance of the trilateral cooperation for its 
most important policy goal. 
Overall, the clear and present danger of North 
Korean military threats should make the U.S.-
Japan-ROK collaboration easier even with their 
different priorities. For effective cooperation, the 
U.S., Japanese, and ROK governments must all 
embrace the centripetal force of the North Korean 
threat while being mindful of the centrifugal force.
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